When Vultures Attack:  Balancing the Right to Immunity Against Reckless Sovereigns by Schubert, Martin F.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 78 | Issue 3 Article 8
2013
When Vultures Attack: Balancing the Right to
Immunity Against Reckless Sovereigns
Martin F. Schubert
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Martin F. Schubert, When Vultures Attack: Balancing the Right to Immunity Against Reckless Sovereigns, 78 Brook. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol78/iss3/8
1097 
When Vultures Attack 
BALANCING THE RIGHT TO IMMUNITY AGAINST 
RECKLESS SOVEREIGNS 
INTRODUCTION 
As the global economy slowly transitions from recession 
to recovery,1 a critical question remains: what (or who) caused 
the Great Recession? Michael Lewis’s Boomerang documented 
the ensuing blame game in the United States: 
[Americans had] been conditioned to grab as much as they could, 
without thinking about the long-term consequences. Afterward, the 
people on Wall Street would privately bemoan the low morals of the 
American people who walked away from their subprime loans, and 
the American people would express outrage at the Wall Street people 
who paid themselves a fortune to design bad loans.2  
While some might be quick to identify such greed and 
dysfunction as uniquely American, Lewis highlighted a similar 
search for answers elsewhere:  
[By summer of 2011,] the Greek parliament debated and voted on a 
bill to [cut government benefits]. Thousands [took] to the streets to 
protest the bill [including] tax collectors on the take, public-school 
teachers who don’t really teach [and] state hospital workers bribed 
to buy overpriced supplies . . . Here they are, and here we are: a 
nation of people looking for anyone to blame but themselves.3  
Faced with a global recession, opposing political parties, 
different social classes, and entire nations were quick to blame 
one another for the ensuing economic chaos. When economic 
uncertainty impacts highly sophisticated financial transactions 
and disputes arise that cannot be resolved voluntarily, the 
parties may end up in court.  
  
 1 See generally Barbara Kollmeyer, Post-Recession Recovery Is Taking A Lot Longer 
this Time, Says OECD, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 27, 2012), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/ 
thetell/2012/11/27/post-recession-recovery-is-taking-a-lot-longer-this-time-says-oecd/ 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013).  
 2 MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN THE NEW THIRD WORLD 202 (2011). 
 3 Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added). 
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In the July 2011 decision of NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco 
Central de la República Argentina (NML Capital),4 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded a pair of 
hedge funds,5 EM Ltd. and NML Capital, Ltd., of the risks of 
engaging in cross-border transactions with foreign 
governments. These particular hedge funds, known as “vulture 
funds” for their aggressive investment and litigation tactics,6 
attempted to attach7 $105 million in Argentine assets8 to satisfy 
almost $2.4 billion in judgments that had already been entered 
against the Republic of Argentina (Republic).9 The assets were 
deposited in the account of the Central Bank of Argentina 
(BCRA) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)10 
and, pursuant to the terms of the transactions at issue,11 the 
vulture funds brought suit against both the Republic and the 
BCRA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.  
  
 4 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 5 A hedge fund is “an investing group usually in the form of a limited 
partnership that employs speculative techniques in the hope of obtaining large capital 
gains.” Hedge Fund Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hedge%20fund (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).  
 6 See Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt 
May Force a Revision of the Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 n.7 
(2008) (“Vulture funds are companies that purchase the debt of poorer countries at 
reduced rates then sue that nation for the full value of the debt plus interest.”). For a 
history of how the secondary market for sovereign debt emerged and the problems it 
created, see Elizabeth Broomfield, Survey, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing 
Government Caps on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
473, 483-85 (2010).  
 7 Attachment is “[t]he seizing of a person’s property to secure a judgment or 
to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed. 2009). 
Execution is the “[j]udicial enforcement of a money judgment, usu[ally] by seizing and 
selling the judgment debtor’s property . . . .” Id. at 650.  
 8 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 178 (“[W]hen plaintiffs moved, for the first time, 
to attach the . . . funds [Argentina] maintained approximately $105 million in its 
account at the [Federal Reserve Bank of New York].”) 
 9 For a list of the judgments entered in favor of NML Capital, Ltd. and EM 
Ltd. on principal and interest payments, see id. at 176 n.6. 
 10 EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (EM II), 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). The 
BCRA used its FRBNY account for typical central bank functions, including 
maintaining “required cash reserves [of] Argentine banks,” settling foreign exchange 
transactions, and providing U.S. dollars to Argentine domestic banks. Id. at 290-91. 
 11 See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.5 (“It is undisputed that in the terms 
and conditions governing each of the securities at issue in this case the Republic agreed 
to submit to the jurisdiction of any New York state or federal court sitting in the 
Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York . . . over any suit, action, or proceeding 
against it or its properties, assets or revenues with respect to [these securities] . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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The court based its analysis on the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),12 codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et 
seq.,13 a federal statute that shields foreign states from being 
sued in U.S. courts as long as their activities are 
noncommercial.14 However, given the fact that the work of a 
foreign state’s central bank is commercial by nature, the FSIA 
includes a provision specifically preventing the attachment of 
foreign central bank property “held for [the foreign central 
bank’s] own account . . . .”15 To determine whether the vulture 
funds could attach the assets, the court dealt with two 
important issues: “whether the funds [were] the property of the 
BCRA ‘held for its own account’ under § 1611(b)(1)”16 and 
whether the Republic nonetheless “explicit[ly] and 
unambiguous[ly]” waived the immunity of the BCRA.17 The 
court held that the funds were the property of the BCRA “held 
for its own account,”18 and that the Republic did not waive the 
BCRA’s immunity in its transactions with the vulture funds.19 
Although the assets at issue represented less than five percent 
of the vulture funds’ judgments,20 their pursuit of assets at one 
of the world’s most secure banks21 represented a test of the 
practicality and efficacy of the FSIA.  
  
 12 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006)). In this note, I will refer to this Act as the FSIA. 
 13 See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196-97. While sovereign immunity refers to 
“[a] government’s immunity from being sued in its own courts without its consent,” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009), foreign immunity describes “[t]he 
immunity of a foreign sovereign, its agents, and its instrumentalities from litigation in 
[another country’s] courts.” Id. For purposes of this note, foreign sovereign immunity is 
synonymous with foreign immunity.  
 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006). 
 15 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
 16 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 191. 
 17 Id. at 197.  
 18 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).  
 19 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196. 
 20 The vulture funds had $2.4 billion in uncollected judgments against 
Argentina and the BCRA only had $105 million in the FRBNY, or about 4.4 percent of 
what it owed. See supra note 9. 
 21 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Federal Reserve Bank of New York at 3-4, 
NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)) (describing how “[t]he FRBNY has 
accounts for approximately 250 foreign central banks and monetary authorities around 
the world” and how, “[a]s of December 31, 2009, the balances in these accounts totaled 
nearly $3 trillion, which represent[ed] approximately 50% of worldwide U.S. dollar-
denominated reserves”). The money at the FRBNY serves many critical functions for 
world financial markets: (1) most of the world holds some reserve currency here; (2) 
such large holdings promote the United States and New York City as financial centers; 
(3) the foreign investments at the FRBNY helps the United States government finance 
its public debt and lower interest rates; and (4) such benefits “promote the U.S. dollar 
as the world’s main currency.” Id. Both the FRBNY and the U.S. government wrote 
amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Republic. See generally id.; Brief for the United 
 
1100 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:3 
This note will argue that amendments to the 1976 
statute might clarify its original intent: to protect foreign 
governments from suit when they act as sovereigns. Part I of 
the note sets forth the purpose and relevant provisions of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Part II recounts the extensive 
litigation between the Republic and the vulture funds. Part III 
discusses problems with the construction of the FSIA, proposes a 
revision, and explains the need for a special interpretation of 
foreign central bank assets as envisioned by the NML Capital 
decision. Finally, Part IV explains why this litigation has reached 
a stalemate and the impact of powerful political and economic 
considerations on the NML Capital decision.  
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: PURPOSE 
AND STRUCTURE 
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
in 1976 as a response to the modern reality that Americans and, 
more importantly, American corporations were “increasingly 
coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by 
foreign states.”22 Both the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees noted that the United States was behind because 
“[u]nlike other legal systems, U.S. law does not afford plaintiffs 
and their counsel with a means to commence a suit that is 
specifically addressed to foreign state defendants.”23 
Unsurprisingly, the bill’s congressional hearings focused on the 
legislation’s benefits for constituents with colorable claims 
against foreign states, which included obtaining “satisfaction of 
[a] judgment through execution against ordinary commercial 
assets.”24 On the other hand, some of the bill’s most powerful 
provisions—and those at issue in NML Capital—provided 
guidance to foreign states on asserting the sovereign immunity 
defense,25 which helps prevent “significant foreign relations 
  
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, NML Capital, 652 F.3d 
172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)). Among the reasons cited by the FRBNY for its support of 
shielding the assets from attachment was the FRBNY’s “substantial interest in a stable 
and certain legal environment for foreign central bank assets.” Brief of Amicus Curiae, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra, at 4. The FRBNY also explained that its 
account holders want “assurance that their accounts at the FRBNY are protected under 
U.S. law” and expect that their “reserves . . . [held] outside of the United States” will be 
protected by “reciprocal international principles of central bank immunity.” Id. at 4.  
 22 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6605, 6630.  
 23 Id. at 7. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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problems” that arise upon execution against the reserves of 
foreign states.26 
A. Immunity as the Basic Premise of the FSIA 
The default rule for suing a foreign governmental entity 
is simple: it cannot be done.27 The FSIA allows for exceptions to 
the general grant of immunity, however, which emerged from a 
doctrine known as “restrictive sovereign immunity.”28 Under 
the doctrine, state acts that are “sovereign or governmental in 
nature” are immune from suit, but those that are commercial 
or normally performed by private persons are not.29 As Deputy 
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State in 1952, Jack B. 
Tate traced the rationale behind stripping immunity from the 
commercial activities of a foreign state in a letter addressed to 
U.S. Attorney General James McGranery30: 
[T]he Department [of State] feels that the widespread and increasing 
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial 
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons 
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the 
courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy 
to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the 
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of 
sovereign immunity.31  
Borne of a desire to protect the business interests of 
American citizens transacting with foreign states abroad, the 
commercial activity exception has formed one of the primary 
battlegrounds for claims aimed at defeating immunity and has 
left courts to decide the commerciality of a number of novel 
issues—for example, furnishing residential space to diplomats,32 
  
 26 Id. at 31. 
 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (stating that a “foreign state shall be immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States” subject to 
certain exceptions); see also id. § 1609 (stating that “the property in the United States 
of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment” subject to similar exceptions).  
 28 Id. §§ 1605, 1610 (outlining the commercial activity exceptions to 
immunity from suit and attachment); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14.  
 29 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14. 
 30 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-
15 (1976) (Letter from Jack B. Tate, Sec’y of State, to James McGranery, Attorney 
General (May 19, 1952)). 
 31 Id. at 714. 
 32 See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 
No. 03-CV-3256 (RCCFM), 2004 WL 2710040, at *1-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2000) 
(granting plaintiff’s discovery request for documents relating to the acquisition of real 
property for residential purposes in order to establish that embassy engaged in 
commercial activity). 
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discriminating against employees,33 and taking hostages.34 
Resolving these issues has left a rich but complicated 
jurisprudence, especially as foreign states and their 
instrumentalities engage in increasingly complex financial 
transactions with private parties.35 
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Key 
Provisions and Jurisprudence 
1. What Is a “Foreign State”? 
According to 28 U.S.C. § 1603, a “‘foreign state’ . . . includes 
a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”36 To qualify as an agency or 
instrumentality according to § 1603(b)(1), the governmental 
entity must be a “separate legal person.”37 Although FSIA 
  
 33 See Shih v. Taipei Econ. & Cultural Representative Office, 693 F. Supp. 2d 
805, 811 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (concluding that employment discrimination was not “peculiar 
to sovereigns” and therefore constituted commercial activity).  
 34 See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(arguing that “kidnapping by itself cannot possibly be described as an act typically 
performed by participants in the market (unless one distorts the notion of a 
marketplace to include a hostage bazaar),” even though “money was allegedly sought 
from relatives of the hostages . . . .”). 
 35 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 
172, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2011) (private bondholders unsuccessfully sought attachment of 
Argentine central bank assets located in the United States to satisfy judgments 
entered against Argentina after their 2001 default on bonds purchased in the 
secondary market by respondents); Wasserstein Perella Emerging Mkts. Fin., L.P. v. 
Province of Formosa, No. 97-CV-793(BSJ), 2000 WL 573231, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 
11, 2000) (Argentine province’s failure to pay a Cayman Islands-based investment 
bank hired to raise money for a loan is commercial in character and, therefore, not 
subject to the FSIA).  
 36 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006). 
 37 Id. § 1603(b): 
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity— 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof, and  
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in 
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third 
country.  
For a discussion of the relevance of the other “agency or instrumentality” requirements 
for foreign central banks, see Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 350-60 (2003). For an in-depth discussion of the “organ 
of a foreign state” requirement of § 1603(b)(2), see Michael A. Granne, Defining “Organ 
of a Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
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jurisprudence includes many cases involving monetary 
authorities,38 the statute does not define the term central bank.39 
This omission has engendered multiple interpretations of § 1603’s 
relevance for foreign central banks.40 When a foreign central bank 
has the status of a separate legal person for FSIA purposes,41 it 
confers an important benefit: it limits its own “liability for the 
acts of its parent government . . .” by acquiring “the sovereign 
character of its parent government for immunity purposes.”42 As 
such, foreign governments and their instrumentalities often argue 
that each entity is a separate legal person and, therefore, that one 
cannot be held liable for the debts of the other.43 
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio 
Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), the U.S. Supreme Court explored 
two circumstances in which the presumption of an 
instrumentality’s independent legal personhood, or “separate 
juridical status,” should be set aside—a result that would place 
liability on the instrumentality for the acts of its parent 
government.44 In that case, Bancec, a short-lived foreign trade 
bank of Cuba in the months following the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution, had an agreement with Citibank, a private 
American bank, to ship sugar to Mississippi.45 Bancec shipped 
the sugar and sued Citibank in New York when it failed to 
pay.46 Citibank did not pay because the newly installed 
  
L. REV. 1 (2008). For purposes of clarity, the word “instrumentality” will be used 
instead of “agency or instrumentality.” See infra Part III.  
 38 See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 613 (1983) LNC Invs., Inc. v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 228 
F.3d 423, 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain 
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1994); Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs Nat’l 
Bank, 919 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 39 See Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 525 (2002) [hereinafter Working 
Group] (noting that “other federal statutes and court decisions provide guidance” on 
defining “central bank”).  
 40 Compare NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 196-97 (citing section 1611(b)(1) for 
foreign central bank analysis under FSIA), with Lee, supra note 37, at 350 (arguing 
that such an analysis must logically begin with section 1603 because if it did not, FSIA 
would not apply to central banks because they would not be foreign states and, 
therefore, they would never qualify for immunity). 
 41 See Lee, supra note 37, at 350 n.81 (“The legislative history of the FSIA 
reflects [the] presupposition [that] as a general matter, entities which meet the 
definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state could assume a variety of 
forms, including . . . a central bank . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 42 See id. at 360. For the purposes of this note, a parent government is a 
foreign state as defined by FSIA that is not an instrumentality.  
 43 See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 617 (1983). 
 44 Id. at 630. 
 45 Id. at 614.  
 46 Id. at 614-15. 
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communists in Cuba expropriated all of Citibank’s property in 
Cuba.47 As a result, Citibank brought counterclaims for an offset 
on the value of its Cuban property in lieu of paying Bancec for 
the sugar.48 The Court rejected the Cuban government’s 
argument that Bancec was legally separate from the parent 
government49 and adhered to precedent by stating that separate 
juridical status would be ignored (1) “where a corporate entity is 
so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of 
principal and agent is created[,]”50 or (2) when recognition of 
independent legal personhood “would work fraud or injustice.”51 
Explaining the first prong, the Court analogized the 
parent government–instrumentality relationship to that of a 
parent corporation and its subsidiary.52 Under principles of 
corporate law, a subsidiary53 is considered legally separate from 
its parent corporation,54 but the “corporate veil,”55 which limits 
the corporation’s liability for the subsidiary’s acts, may be 
pierced if “[d]ominion [is] so complete, interference so 
obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be 
a principal and the subsidiary an agent.”56 When the principal 
controls the agent in this manner, courts label the agent as the 
  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 616. 
 49 Id. at 632-33.  
 50 Id. at 629 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-04 
(1960)). It is important to not confuse the U.S. Supreme Court’s reference to “agent” 
with the idea of “agency” as used in FSIA. When a court decides that an entity, such as 
a foreign central bank, is an agent of its principal (i.e., its parent government), it 
effectively erases the distinction between foreign states and agencies or 
instrumentalities and thereby creates a principal-agent relationship between the 
parent government and foreign central bank. See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 299 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República 
Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). When the principal-agent relationship is 
created, the agent becomes the alter ego of the principal and “could be liable for the 
debts of the [principal].” Id. 
 51 Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629 (citing Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 
322 (1939)).  
 52 Id. at 630.  
 53 A “subsidiary corporation” is “[a] corporation in which a parent corporation 
has a controlling share.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (9th ed. 2009).  
 54 See, e.g., Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 
265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 55 See generally I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496-97 (1912) (coining the phrase “pierc[ing] the veil” to describe 
situations in which a corporation’s separate legal status should be disregarded because the 
corporation attempts “to commit iniquity, to perpetrate fraud, to achieve monopoly, or to 
accomplish wrongs, under the guise, and hiding behind the veil, of corporate existence”).  
 56 N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960) (quoting Berkey 
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)). See RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF AGENCY § 219 (1933) (“[A] master is subject to liability for injuries caused by 
the tortious conduct of servants within the scope of their employment.”).  
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“alter ego” of the principal, and one can be held liable for the 
acts of the other.57  
The second prong represents general equitable 
principles of justice and fairness. In Bancec, the Cuban 
government used the corporate form in an attempt to avoid its 
obligations to Citibank.58 The Court explained that it was not 
fair to allow Cuba to invoke American law under the FSIA to 
avoid Citibank’s rightful counterclaim.59 The Court argued that 
this situation mirrored that in National City Bank v. Republic 
of China—the foreign state “wants our law, like any other 
litigant, but it wants our law free from the claims of justice.”60 
In such circumstances, the Court found it fair to ignore the 
corporate form.  
2. The Commercial Activity Exceptions 
The FSIA provides for two types of commercial activity 
exceptions: the commercial exception to immunity from suit 
under § 1605(a)(2)61 and the commercial exception to immunity 
from attachment under § 1610(a)(2) and (b)(2).62 The difference 
  
 57 See Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60, 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting 1 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 41.10 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[I]f the shareholders or the 
corporations themselves disregard the proper formalities of a corporation, then the law 
will do likewise as necessary to protect individual and corporate creditors.”). 
 58 Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630-32 (1983). 
 59 Id. at 630. 
 60 Id. at 632 (quoting Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361-
62 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006): 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case— 
. . . . 
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign states; or upon an act performed in the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere; or upon an 
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign states elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States . . . . 
 62 See id. § 1610(a)(2): 
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 
1603(a) . . . , used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be 
immune from attachment . . . upon a judgment entered by a court of the United 
States or of a State . . . if— 
. . . . 
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between immunity from suit and immunity from attachment is 
important: the latter will only apply if plaintiffs successfully 
bring the defendant foreign state within the court’s jurisdiction 
and obtain a judgment.63  
Section 1605(a)(2) strips a foreign state of its immunity 
when state action is “based upon a commercial activity . . . .”64 
Under § 1603(d), commercial activity “means either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity 
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of 
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its purpose.”65 While the statute clearly demands 
that courts determine commerciality by looking at the foreign 
state’s actions rather than its motives, the statute leaves a 
critical word, commercial, undefined.  
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.66 filled this 
statutory gap. To encourage international trade, Argentina 
offered a program to its domestic businesses whereby the 
government would provide them with U.S. dollars in exchange 
for Argentine pesos.67 When the program failed as a result of 
Argentina’s insufficient U.S. dollar reserves, Argentina 
refinanced the foreign exchange agreements by issuing bonds 
  
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the 
claim was based . . . .  
. . . . 
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of 
an . . . instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in 
the United States shall not be immune from attachment . . . upon a judgment 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State . . . if— 
. . . .  
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the . . . instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(2) . . . regardless of whether the property 
is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based . . . . 
(emphasis added); see also Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 
240, 254-55 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining some of the differences between sections 1605 
and 1610). 
 63 See Lee, supra note 37, at 375 (noting that “[i]t is one thing to obtain a 
judgment against a foreign state or agency or instrumentality, but quite another to 
recover on it”).  
 64 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 65 Id. § 1603(d). 
 66 504 U.S. 607 (1992).  
 67 Id. at 609 (describing how this policy would stimulate international trade 
because “Argentina’s currency is not one of the mediums of exchange accepted on the 
international market” and, therefore, Argentine businesses engaging in foreign 
transactions needed U.S. dollars). 
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that guaranteed repayment to all affected foreign creditors.68 
But as the repayment date approached, Argentina concluded 
that it could not pay on the bonds, so it unilaterally extended the 
time for payment and issued another round of agreements 
promising future payment.69 Foreign creditors refused, however.70 
Instead, the foreign creditors sued Argentina under § 1605(a)(2), 
arguing that these transactions were commercial activities.71  
The Supreme Court sided with the foreign creditors, 
finding that Argentina’s borrowing activity was commercial 
under the FSIA because it acted as “a private player within [a 
market]” rather than as a regulator.72 By focusing on the nature 
rather than the purpose of a transaction, the Court broadened 
the commercial activity exception and brought an arguably 
governmental program within the exception. In effect, it no 
longer mattered “why Argentina participated in the bond market 
in the manner of a private actor; it matters only that it did so.”73  
3. The Waiver Exceptions 
Section 1605(a)(1) brings a foreign state under the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts if the foreign state waived its 
immunity “either explicitly or by implication.”74 But “[i]mplicit 
waiver . . . is a second best approach, and a distant second at 
that.”75 Courts’ tendencies to reject anything but an explicit 
  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 610. 
 70 See id. The foreign creditors who brought the suit were two Panamanian 
corporations and a Swiss bank, who were able to sue in New York because the bond 
agreements “provide[d] for payment of interest and principal in United States 
dollars . . . through transfer on the London, Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York 
market . . . .” Id. at 609-10.  
 71 See id. at 612.  
 72 Id. at 620. 
 73 Id. at 608.  
 74 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).  
 75 Lee, supra note 37, at 339; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617 (considering explicit and implicit waivers of 
immunity by the foreign state. An explicit waiver would most likely be included in the 
plain language of a contract. Implicit waivers may be found in cases “where a foreign 
state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has agreed 
that the law of a particular country should govern a contract.”); George K. Foster, 
Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing Arbitral 
Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some 
Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 676 (2008) (“Explicit waivers 
are often found in a contract between the sovereign and the creditor that predates the 
dispute. Such a waiver can be of great value at the enforcement stage, should a dispute 
ever arise, so it is always good practice for an investor to seek to include such a 
provision when negotiating a contract with a foreign sovereign.”). 
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waiver corroborate this perspective.76 Waiver issues are often 
litigated concurrently with “alter ego” arguments, and a finding 
that an instrumentality is the “alter ego” of the parent 
government would mean that the parent government might have 
waived its immunity through the instrumentality, as well.77 As a 
result, courts often favor a “clear and unambiguous” approach to 
drafting waivers,78 which explicitly names any agencies or 
instrumentalities that are subject to the waiver of immunity.79  
C. Implications for Foreign Central Banks 
For a variety of arguably noncommercial, governmental 
transactions, Weltover casts doubt on a foreign central bank’s 
ability to act “as financial agent for the government” without 
subjecting itself to the commercial activity exceptions to 
immunity from suit and attachment.80 One court stepped even 
further by stating “[a] contract, implied or otherwise, is 
inherently commercial, even when the ultimate purpose behind 
it is governmental regulation.”81 Considering the pervasiveness 
of contracts in the public sector, this view would swallow the 
general rule of sovereign immunity. 
Weltover’s broad interpretation of commerciality for 
purposes of immunity from suit also has implications for 
enforcement of judgments through attachment of property, 
  
 76 See, e.g., Eaglet Corp. v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 839 F. Supp. 232 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) aff’d, 23 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1994); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of 
Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 77 See, e.g., EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d. 273, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) vacated sub nom. 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 78 See Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 79 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 195-96 (holding that despite the Republic’s 
broadly worded waiver of immunity in the bond instruments that plaintiffs purchased, 
“it does not appear to clearly and unambiguously waive BCRA’s immunity . . . .”). 
 80 See Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank,15 F.3d 238, 243-44 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (state-owned Iraqi bank not immune from suit when it did not honor its loan 
guarantee); Weston Compagnie de Fin. et D’Investissement, S.A. v. La República del 
Ecuador, 823 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Banco Central del Ecuador not 
immune from suit after it defaulted on loan agreements with its Swiss creditor, a 
financial institution which purchased Swiss debt); see also Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 
930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991) (government financing for the purchase of military aircraft 
considered commercial). But see De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 
1394-95 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting a pre-Weltover consideration of the underlying purpose 
of the transaction to hold that the Central Bank’s issuance of a check was governmental 
even though check writing is private-like in nature).  
 81 Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (S.D. Fla. 
1986) (citations omitted). 
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especially for central banks. Since central banks typically qualify 
as instrumentalities under § 1603(b),82 it would appear that 
Congress chose to provide a special rule for certain assets of a 
foreign central bank. Section 1611(b)(1) provides that, 
notwithstanding the provisions of § 1610, the property of a foreign 
bank or monetary authority “held for its own account” is immune 
from attachment . . . unless the central bank or monetary authority 
or its parent foreign government has explicitly waived its immunity 
from attachment . . . .83  
The interplay between the commerciality of central bank 
activities, the special protection from attachment the FSIA 
affords foreign central bank property “held for its own 
account,”84 and waivers of immunity set the stage for over ten 
years of litigation between the Republic of Argentina and the 
vulture funds. 
II. ARGENTINA’S DEFAULT AND SECOND CIRCUIT FSIA 
INTERPRETATION: 2001–2011  
Founded in 1935, the BCRA, by Argentine law, is “a 
self-administered institution of the [Argentine] State,” charged 
with representing the Republic’s financial interests with 
foreign entities and regulating Argentina’s domestic banking 
and financial sectors.85 These functions included a BCRA bank 
account at the FRBNY for the management of the Republic’s 
dollar reserves.86 When the Republic defaulted on $80 billion of 
foreign-owned debt in 2001, it stopped principal and interest 
payments on that debt.87 Although the economic situation in 
Argentina following the 2001 default was extremely severe,88 
  
 82 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 83 See Lee, supra note 37, at 376 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Although instrumentalities enjoy sovereign-like immunity, an “instrumentality enjoys 
immunity from attachment and execution on terms less generous than those applicable 
to the [parent government] itself.” Id. at 360; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2), (b)(2) 
(2006) (allowing creditors to attach property of a parent government “used for the 
commercial activity upon which the claim is based . . . .” and expanding that 
attachment right against instrumentalities “regardless of whether the property is or 
was involved in the act upon which the claim is based”); id. § 1611(b)(1) (the special 
central bank immunity provision).  
 84 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
 85 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 
177 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 175.  
 88 See Charles Newbery & Alexei Barrionuevo, As Greece Ponders Default, 
Lessons from Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, (June 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/ 
24/business/global/24peso.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (“[In 2001], as Argentina slid 
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some questioned Argentina’s claims that it could not pay its 
debt in subsequent years, citing the fact that the Republic ran 
surpluses in certain years following the default.89  
Rather than participate in the Republic’s global 
exchange offers between 2005 and 2010,90 which offered 
creditors new securities for the nonperforming bonds on less 
favorable terms,91 the vulture funds92 pursued claims for full 
recovery on the original bond terms.93 The litigation against the 
Republic and the BCRA in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York94 resulted in unpaid judgments 
of almost $2.4 billion against the Republic since 2003.95 Saddled 
with these interest-accruing judgments, a devalued Argentine 
peso, and $9.8 billion in debts due to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Republic moved more than $32 
billion out of its FRBNY account between 2001 and 2005 in an 
  
toward financial collapse, banks barricaded themselves behind sheet metal to keep out 
protesters demanding access to their life savings.”). 
 89 See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The court must also 
take into account the bad faith of the Republic following the default . . . . Indeed, the 
record shows that during certain of [the ensuing] years the Republic ran a surplus.”), 
vacated sub nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172. 
 90 See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.4 (explaining the terms of the 2005 
and 2010 “global exchange offers”). 
 91 See Drew Benson & Eliana Raszewski, Argentina Offers 66% Haircut on 
Defaulted Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-04-15/argentina-offers-new-bonds-to-holders-of-20-billion-debt-to-end-
default.html (reporting that the 2005 and 2010 restructurings offered similar terms, 
with creditors receiving approximately thirty-four cents on the dollar). 
 92 See Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story Of How A Hedge Fund Detained 
A Vessel In Ghana and Even Went For Argentina’s “Air Force One,” FORBES (Oct. 5, 
2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-
behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-the-
presidential-plane/ (identifying NML Capital as “a subsidiary of U.S. billionaire Paul 
Singer’s Elliott Capital”); see also Karen De Witt, Exile’s Effort to Return Puts Focus on 
Tax Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1995/10/01/us/exile-s-effort-to-return-puts-focus-on-tax-loophole.html (describing Kenneth 
Dart, funder of EM Ltd., and his plan to return to the U.S. as consul for Belize, his 
adopted country, after he renounced his American citizenship to avoid capital gains 
and estate taxes). 
 93 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.6 (listing the various suits and judgments 
between the vulture funds and the Republic). 
 94 See id. at 176 n.5 (“It is undisputed that in the terms and conditions 
governing each of the securities at issue in this case the Republic agreed to submit to 
the jurisdiction of any New York state or federal court sitting in the Borough of 
Manhattan, The City of New York . . . over any suit, action, or proceeding against it or 
its properties, assets, or revenues with respect to [these securities] . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006) (allowing explicit 
waivers of jurisdictional immunity).  
 95 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.3 (aggregating judgments on principal and 
interest payments). 
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attempt to shield assets from its creditors.96 When the Republic 
transferred $2.1 billion to its Swiss bank account within three 
months,97 the vulture funds realized they were in danger of 
failing to collect on their judgments and moved to attach the 
$105 million in BCRA assets remaining in the BCRA’s FRBNY 
account.98 These actions represented the beginning of a 
prolonged legal battle between the Republic and vulture funds, 
highlighted by two legal decisions: EM Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina (EM I)99 and NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de 
la República Argentina (NML Capital).100 
A. The EM I Litigation: 2005–2007101 
On December 30, 2005, the vulture funds successfully 
moved to freeze the FRBNY funds through an ex parte 
proceeding,102 but Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York vacated the 
decision two weeks later.103 On appeal from the order vacating 
the attachment orders, the vulture funds argued that the 
Kirchner Decrees, two emergency executive decrees issued by 
Argentina’s then-president Néstor Kirchner on December 15, 
2005, effectively transferred ownership of the BCRA’s FRBNY 
  
 96 See id. at 178 (attributing the depletion of FRBNY assets to the cost of 
“prop[ping] up” the value of the Argentine peso through the purchase of pesos with $20 
billion and transfers of excess funds to “more protective jurisdictions . . . as a 
preventive measure against possible wrongful attachment efforts by creditors of the 
Republic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 97 See id. at 177-78 (chronicling the BCRA’s account transfers); see also NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 8845 (TPG), 2011 WL 3897828, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was founded in 
Switzerland in 1930 and “consists of 56 central banks or national monetary 
authorities.” Id. It offers its accountholders “virtually absolute immunity from 
attachment . . . under Swiss law” and does not accept deposits from national 
governments, private individuals or corporations. Id. 
 98 See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 178. 
 99 EM I, 473 F.3d 463, 480-85 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 100 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172. 
 101 In its 2011 decision NML Capital, the Second Circuit refers to its 2007 
decision as EM I. The EM I designation is helpful because the 2010 District Court case 
was decided under the name EM Ltd. as well. The author will refer to the 2011 District 
Court case, reversed by the NML Capital decision, as EM II in order to distinguish the 
2007 Second Circuit case from the 2011 District Court case.  
 102 EM I, 473 F.3d at 468-69. 
 103 See EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that an 
earlier December 30, 2005 decision was reversed because (1) payments to the IMF were 
not commercial activity and (2) the BCRA did not waive its immunity), vacated sub 
nom. NML Capital, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).  
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assets to the Republic.104 If plaintiffs had succeeded in this 
argument, they would have been able to escape the broad grant 
of immunity to central banks in § 1611(b)(1) of the FSIA 
because the property would now be considered that of the 
Republic, not the BCRA.105 As such, if the foreign state had 
waived its immunity or the property had met the commercial 
activity exception, the property would have been attachable 
under § 1610.106  
But the EM I court held otherwise, basing its decision 
on three factors: (1) the distinction between the Republic’s 
control over the BCRA and the BCRA’s control over the assets; 
(2) the noncommercial nature of debt repayments to the IMF 
from the BCRA’s FRBNY account; and (3) the subtle distinction 
regarding the applicability of waivers of immunity.107 First, the 
court explained that plaintiffs could not attach funds at the 
FRBNY because the funds were held in the BCRA’s name, and 
therefore the BCRA, not the Republic, possessed the property.108 
Even if, as plaintiffs argued, the Kirchner Decrees had made it 
possible for the President of the Republic “to appropriate (or 
borrow) the [BCRA funds at the FRBNY] to pay Argentina’s 
debts and then direct when and how the payment should be 
made . . . ,”109 the Second Circuit explained that “the Republic’s 
ability and willingness to control BCRA” did not necessarily 
mean that the Republic controlled decisions over which assets 
the BCRA would use to repay the IMF debt.110 Rather, the court 
stated that the BCRA had discretion over the “specific funds” 
that would service the debt.111  
Even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ arguments about a 
conversion of ownership from the BCRA to the Republic, the 
court held that the commercial activity exception for foreign 
states in § 1610(a)(2) did not apply because the use of the 
  
 104 See EM I, 473 F.3d at 468 (explaining that the Kirchner Decrees directed 
the Ministry of Economy and Production to issue a resolution to BCRA requiring it to 
repay the Republic’s debt to the IMF).  
 105 See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2006) (applying special immunity provision to 
central banks only, not other foreign states or instrumentalities).  
 106 See id. § 1610(a)(1)-(2). 
 107 See EM I, 473 F.3d at 475-86. 
 108 See id. at 474 & n.10 (explaining that under New York law “[w]hen a party 
holds funds in a bank account, possession is established, and the presumption of 
ownership follows”). 
 109 Id. at 474. 
 110 Id. at 475. 
 111 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the lack of central bank independence 
in Latin America, see Harout Jack Samra, Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America: A 
Survey and Case Studies, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2009). 
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FRBNY’s monetary reserves to repay debt to the IMF was not 
commercial activity.112 Here, the court distinguished IMF 
payments from the “commercially-available debt instruments” 
sold by Argentina to creditors in Weltover,113 where the Supreme 
Court considered the debt instruments to be commercial 
because they “may be held by private parties; they are 
negotiable and may be traded on the international market . . . ; 
and they promise a future stream of cash income.”114 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit explained that the relationship of 
Argentina to the IMF lacked these private-like qualities 
because IMF membership extends only to sovereign nations; 
the IMF’s mission is preservation of a stable international 
monetary system; and IMF loans “are not available in the 
commercial market.”115 In other words, even if past funds at the 
FRBNY had serviced Argentina’s debt to the IMF, plaintiffs had 
not shown that the $105 million of BCRA assets still in deposit 
at the FRBNY were designated for IMF debt payments.116 
Finally, mirroring LNC Investments, Inc. v. Banco 
Central de Nicaragua,117 the Second Circuit addressed the 
Republic’s explicit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction and 
attachment, as well as the waiver’s applicability to the BCRA.118 
In LNC Investments, a creditor sought to execute on the assets 
of the Central Bank of Nicaragua.119 The court held that a 
central bank’s assets could not be used to satisfy a judgment 
against a parent government, even if the parent government 
“waive[s] the immunity of its central bank pursuant to 
§ 1611.”120 The court reasoned that § 1611 permits attachment 
of such assets “when, and only when, the central bank or its 
parent government has made an explicit waiver of the bank’s 
immunity.”121 By raising this point, the court stated that plaintiffs 
  
 112 See EM I, 473 F.3d at 480-85. 
 113 Id. at 482-85. 
 114 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615 (1992). 
 115 EM I, 473 F.3d at 482-84. The court also addressed the commercial 
question in the alternative, noting that it “would be required to hold that, on the 
present record, the FRBNY Funds are not available for attachment under § 1610 
because the FRBNY Funds were never used for commercial activity . . . .” Id. at 484. 
 116 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
 117 115 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2000) (per 
curiam). 
 118 EM I, 473 F.3d at 485-86.  
 119 Id. at 361. 
 120 Id. at 486. 
 121 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LNC Invs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 362-63). 
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should have relied on “well-established” Bancec principles rather 
than focusing on commerciality and waiver arguments.122  
Rather than suing the Republic and arguing that 
ownership of the BCRA assets at the FRBNY had transferred 
to the Republic, the court hinted that the plaintiffs should have 
argued that the BCRA was the “alter ego” of the Republic, 
thereby defeating the presumption that the BCRA deserved 
“separate juridical status” and stripping it of the § 1611(b)(1) 
central bank immunity.123 Under these circumstances, the 
Republic’s waiver of immunity from attachment would apply to 
the BCRA because the bank and parent government would be 
“alter egos” of one another.124  
B. The NML Capital Decision (2006–2010) 
Apparently the vulture funds had recognized the 
efficacy of the “alter ego” argument before the 2007 EM I 
opinion, because they filed a new action in 2006 “seeking a 
declaratory judgment to the effect that BCRA is the alter ego of 
the Republic.”125 Once again, Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
presided, holding that the BCRA was not entitled to separate 
juridical status under Bancec.126 Under Bancec’s first prong,127 
the court found that the BCRA was, in fact, the “alter ego” of 
the Republic because the Republic expressly directed the BCRA 
to pay the Republic’s IMF debt, the Republic was able to “draw 
on the resources of the BCRA at will,” and the BCRA ignored 
its mandate to operate independently of the Republic.128 Under 
Bancec’s second prong,129 the court found such use of the BCRA 
funds “contributed to fraud and injustice perpetrated . . . on the 
bondholders” because the bonds gave rights of attachment and 
  
 122 Id. at 476-77. 
 123 Id. at 477-78. 
 124 For a discussion of the “alter ego” analysis, see Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 617-
18 (1983).  
 125 EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated sub nom. NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 126 Id. at 273-74, 297-302. 
 127 See supra Part I.B.1.  
 128 EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 299-300. The court accurately described the 
Republic’s control over the BCRA. The BCRA featured three “short-term 
governors . . . marked by disagreement with the Republic over the BCRA’s 
independence.” Id. at 281. The Argentine government since 2001 had enacted laws 
giving the Republic increasing control over the BCRA. Id. at 284.  
 129 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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execution that the Republic refused to honor.130 Accordingly, the 
court held that the separate juridical status of the BCRA 
should be disregarded because the Republic had explicitly 
waived its immunity from suit and attachment, refused to pay 
its debts in full, and then argued that its waiver did not apply 
to the BCRA.131  
Since the BCRA was the “alter ego” of the Republic, a 
waiver of the Republic’s immunity would also apply to the 
BCRA because the funds now belonged to the Republic, rather 
than to the BCRA’s account.132 Attachment of the Republic’s 
assets would be proper under § 1610(a), however, only if such 
property was “used for a commercial activity” as interpreted by 
Weltover.133 The court found that the $105 million on deposit at 
the FRBNY had “the ability to earn a certain amount of income 
on balances”134—a commercial activity “by which a private party 
engages in trade and traffic or commerce.”135 Since the BCRA 
and the Republic were “alter egos” under Bancec analysis, the 
BCRA was no longer eligible for the special foreign central bank 
immunity protection of § 1611(b)(1) and, instead, fell under the 
attachment exceptions that would normally apply only to the 
Republic’s commercial property in the United States.136 Since the 
district court had considered the FRBNY accounts to be 
commercial and the Republic had explicitly waived all 
immunity, it concluded that the funds at the FRBNY were 
subject to attachment.137  
The Second Circuit vacated on appeal,138 focusing its 
analysis on the statute itself, rather than on the Bancec 
  
 130 EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 301. 
 131 Id. at 303-04. 
 132 Id. at 300-01. 
 133 Id. at 303; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006); Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1992).  
 134 EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614). 
 136 Id. at 303-04. 
 137 See id. at 303 (granting motions for attachment). 
 138 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 
197 (2d Cir. 2011). Circuit Judge José A. Cabranes, who wrote the 2007 EM I decision 
with Circuit Judges Ralph K. Winter and Rosemary S. Pooler, see EM I, 473 F.3d 463 
(2d Cir. 2007), also wrote the 2011 NML Capital decision, this time with Circuit Judge 
Roger Miner and Senior Circuit Judge Chester J. Straub. NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 
174. In NML Capital, the Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s rationale 
regarding claim preclusion. See id. at 185 (quoting Dayco Corp. v. Foreign Transactions 
Corp., 705 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir.1983)). The District Court had held that claim preclusion 
did not apply because “[t]he motions for attachments . . . made in December 2005 were 
part of an ongoing process . . . [,] had no independent status as actions for 
lawsuits . . . [,] did not lead to independent judgments. . . [, and] were nothing more nor 
less than motions [without] final disposition . . . .” EM II, 720 F. Supp. 2d. at 295. The 
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precedent.139 In fact, the court rejected the idea of a Bancec-like 
“independence requirement for the immunity of central bank 
assets,”140 arguing instead that “the only qualification for 
immunity under § 1611(b)(1) is whether the property of the 
central bank is ‘held for its own account.’”141 First, the court 
presumed that the funds at the FRBNY were held for the 
BCRA’s own account because the account was “in the name of a 
central bank.”142 But this presumption could be rebutted by a 
showing that the FRBNY funds were “not being used for central 
banking functions as such functions are normally understood, 
irrespective of their ‘commercial’ nature.”143  
Although the FSIA does not mention the concept of 
“normally understood . . . central bank[] functions,”144 the court 
adopted a “modified test”—combining analysis of the “plain 
language” of the statute with the “central bank activities 
test”—to determine whether central bank property is ‘held for 
its own account.’”145 Here, the parties had stipulated in March 
2009 that the BCRA derived the FRBNY-held funds, in part, 
from accumulating foreign exchange reserves to regulate the 
Argentine peso and regulating “the custody of cash reserves of 
commercial banks,” both of which are “paradigmatic central 
banking functions.”146 As a result, the court ruled that these 
  
appellate court also addressed issue preclusion, holding that it did not apply because 
“the legal and factual issues presented in the two cases are very different.” NML 
Capital, 652 F.3d at 186. While EM I focused on asset ownership and the non-
commercial nature of IMF debt, 473 F.3d at 476-85, the Bancec motions of NML 
Capital dealt with plaintiffs’ “alter ego” theory and “[were] not litigated, much less 
decided . . . , by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .” NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 186 
(citations omitted).  
 139 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 188. 
 140 Id.; see also id. at 190 (citations omitted) (explaining that when the FSIA 
was passed in 1976, central banks were more dependent on their parent governments).  
 141 Id. at 188.  
 142 Id. at 194. 
 143 Id.; see also id. at 194 n.20 (explaining that the court “recognize[s] that 
there is no definitive list of activities ‘normally understood’ to be central banking 
functions . . . , [but] even in unusual circumstances it is not difficult to tell whether a 
central bank is engaged in a function characteristic of central banks”). 
 144 See Ernest T. Patrikis, Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity from 
Attachment in the United States, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 274, 277 (1982) (regarding 
“central bank activities” to include: “(1) issue of notes, coin, and legal tender, (2) 
custody and administration of the nation’s monetary reserves through the holding of 
gold, silver, domestic and foreign securities, foreign exchange, . . . and other credit 
instruments . . . , (3) establishment and maintenance of reserves of depository 
institutions, (4) discounts and advances to depository institutions, (5) receipt of 
deposits from the government, international organizations, depository institutions, and 
in special cases, private persons, (6) open market operations, (7) credit controls, and (8) 
licensing, supervision, and inspection of banks”).  
 145 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146 Id. at 195. 
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assets were “held for [the BCRA’s] own account” under 
§ 1611(b)(1) because, regardless of their commerciality, both 
activities were typical of central banks.147  
Finally, the court concluded that although the Republic 
waived its FSIA immunity, its waiver “did not mention the 
[Republic’s] instrumentalities . . . or the BCRA in particular . . . .”148 
Since the Republic’s waiver was “worded broadly, it d[id] not 
appear to clearly and unambiguously waive BCRA’s immunity 
from attachment, as it must do in order to be effective.”149 Therefore, 
the court held that the remaining $105 million in FRBNY funds 
were immune from attachment by the vulture funds.150  
III. FSIA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS  
After more than thirty years of FSIA litigation, FSIA 
jurisprudence remains uncertain.151 After the NML Capital 
decision, key terms in the FSIA are still subject to various 
judicial interpretations, and the rights and obligations of 
debtors and creditors under the FSIA remain ambiguous.152 
Although some of this confusion may be attributed to the fact 
that most FSIA cases implicate cross-border transactions of 
significant financial and political complexity, the ambiguity of 
certain provisions of the statute, especially the definition of key 
terms in § 1603, makes interpretation more difficult.  
A. The Confusion 
The distinction between a “foreign state” and an “agency 
or instrumentality” is important because § 1610 makes it easier 
to attach the property of an agency or instrumentality than the 
property of a foreign state.153 However, § 1603 does not 
  
 147 Id. at 194-95. 
 148 Id. at 196. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See generally, e.g., Working Group, supra note 39, at 595-617. 
 152 For a broader perspective on the uncertain role of FSIA in cross-border 
restructuring disputes, see Steven M. Davidoff, In Court Battle, a Game of Brinkmanship 
with Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/11/27/in-court-battle-a-game-of-brinkmanship-with-argentina/.  
 153 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2006) (permitting an exception to 
immunity from attachment of foreign state property in the United States used for a 
commercial activity if “the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon 
which the claim was based” (emphasis added)), with § 1610(b)(2) (permitting an 
exception to immunity from attachment of the property in the United States of a 
commercially-engaged agency or instrumentality of the agency “regardless of whether 
the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based” (emphasis 
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adequately define “foreign state,” mentioning only that it 
“includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .”154 Such fact-specific 
inquiries into the internal governance structures of foreign 
nations could be complex and delicate from the perspective of 
foreign relations.155  
The ambiguity of what constitutes a “political 
subdivision” and the status of an agency or instrumentality as 
a foreign state may also create legal arguments that Congress 
did not intend. For example, a sovereign defendant could argue 
that even though Congress drafted specific attachment provisions 
for agencies and instrumentalities, the broader attachment 
immunity granted to foreign states should apply to agencies and 
instrumentalities.156 As a result, any strategy aimed at clarifying 
the FSIA would need to be both specific and flexible.157  
B. Potential Solutions 
1. Drop “Agency” 
The term “agency” is misleading and should be dropped 
in favor of “instrumentality” alone.158 The confusion over the 
meaning of “agency” derives from two sources. First, and not 
surprising given that the current definition of foreign state 
includes agencies and instrumentalities,159 “the use of the term 
‘agency’ . . . appeared to include departments or ministries that 
were intended to be part of the foreign state.”160 Second, the 
distinction between foreign states and agencies or 
  
added)); see also Working Group, supra note 39, at 585 (noting that § 1610(a)(2) is 
unnecessarily difficult because “[o]nly in rare instances would a foreign state have 
property in the United States . . . ‘used’ for the activity giving rise to the 
claim . . . . [because] [i]n many cases, such as those involving a foreign state’s failure to 
pay for U.S. goods or services or breach of an employment contract or lease, no property 
of the foreign state related to the claim exists at all, much less in the United States”). 
 154 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
 155 See Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 
2008) (explaining that the Saudi Arabian National Guard “is considered a political 
subdivision of [a] foreign state under the [FSIA]”); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea 
Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that “the Bolivian Air Force is a 
‘foreign state or political subdivision’”).  
 156 The statute again highlights this confusion by stating that the more 
narrow immunity afforded to agencies and instrumentalities by section § 1610(b) 
governs “[i]n addition to [the more broad immunity granted by] subsection (a).” 28 
U.S.C. § 1610(a)-(b). 
 157 See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508.  
 158 See id. 
 159 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
 160 See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508. 
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instrumentalities partially rests on whether the agency or 
instrumentality is a legal person separate from its parent 
government.161 To determine whether the presumption of 
separate legal personhood has been overcome, the Bancec 
Court outlined an “alter ego” test,162 which would create a 
principal-agent relationship if satisfied.163 This is confusing 
because the FSIA uses “agency” to mean a legally separate 
entity while Bancec uses the term “agent” to refer to a non-
legally separate entity.164 Dropping “agency” in favor of the term 
“instrumentality” would resolve this confusion.165  
2. The “Core Function Test” 
One group of scholars has identified a pattern whereby 
courts applied either a “core function test” or a “legal 
characteristics test” to distinguish a foreign state from an 
instrumentality.166 The former test, applied in Transaero, Inc. v. 
La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana,167 looks at the “core function” of the 
entity: if the core function is governmental, the entity is a 
foreign state; if the core function is commercial, the entity is an 
instrumentality.168 A report published by the American Bar 
Association (ABA Report) rightly criticized this approach 
because it was “duplicative of the commercial activity analysis 
required at a later stage of litigation . . . .”169 Since the core 
function test would have already classified governmental, 
noncommercial entities as foreign states, the test would defeat 
all subsequent FSIA commercial activity provisions for foreign 
states. As such, the statute would rarely subject a foreign state 
to a commercial activity exception to immunity because foreign 
states are rarely, if ever, commercial under the test. The 
statute includes commercial activity exceptions for foreign 
states, and therefore, application of the core functions test 
would defeat statutory intent. 
  
 161 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
 162 See Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).  
 163 See id.; supra Part I.B.1.  
 164 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b), with Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629. 
 165 See Working Group, supra note 39, at 508.  
 166 Id. at 509.  
 167 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
 168 See id. at 153 (applying the core functions test to hold that the Bolivian Air 
Force was a foreign state because it was “so closely bound up with the structure of the 
state that they must in all cases be considered as the ‘foreign state’ itself, rather than a 
separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state”). 
 169 Working Group, supra note 39, at 514.  
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3. The “Legal Characteristics Test”  
The “legal characteristics test,” which analyzes the legal 
rights of governmental entities, is a better alternative in light 
of its case-by-case approach.170 If the entity is able to “sue and be 
sued, own property, and contract, all in its own name,”171 it is an 
instrumentality.172 Other legal characteristics analyzed may 
include “whether the entity maintains a distinct personality, was 
sufficiently capitalized, observes corporate formalities, [and] 
maintains corporate records . . . whether and to what extent the 
entity provides its own financing or receives government 
appropriations, and whether the entity hires public employees.”173  
The ABA Report, however, recommends weighing an 
additional factor better left out of any proposed revision to the 
FSIA. The report includes “whether the state’s assets would be 
subject to execution if the plaintiff obtained judgment against 
the foreign entity” as a relevant factor.174 Such a determination 
would require courts to analyze the attachment provisions of 
§ 1610, which differ for foreign states and instrumentalities.175 
In other words, resolving entity status ought not to rest on a 
factor partially dependent on that very same decision.  
4. One Proposed Revision 
Despite this complication, the fact-intensive “totality of 
the circumstances” approach of the “legal characteristics test” 
should be codified in the statute. The relevant § 1603 provisions, 
as envisioned by the ABA Report’s amendments, would read: 
For purposes of this chapter— 
(a) A “foreign state” includes its government and political 
subdivisions, departments, ministries, armed services, and 
independent regulatory agencies. . . . Foreign state does not include 
an instrumentality of the state. 
(b) An “instrumentality” of a foreign state means any entity that— 
  
 170 Id. 
 171 Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding 
that Finland’s Government Guarantee Fund was an instrumentality because, among 
other characteristics, it “may own shares in deposit banks and asset management 
companies”). 
 172 See Working Group, supra note 39, at 512 (citing Unidyne Corp. v. 
Aerolineas Argentinas, 590 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1984)).  
 173 Id. at 515.  
 174 Id.  
 175 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006). 
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(1) is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and  
(2) is an organ of a foreign state or has a majority of its shares 
or other ownership interest owned directly, or indirectly through 
one or more other instrumentalities, by one or more foreign 
states, and 
(3) is created under the laws of one or more of the states to which 
section 1603(b)(2) refers and is not a citizen of a State of the 
United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title.176 
Since foreign central banks do not fit into any of the categories 
outlined in revised subsection (a), it seems clear that foreign 
central banks would be instrumentalities, especially in light of 
the legislative history of the FSIA and modern central bank 
practice.177 Nevertheless, the court in NML Capital disagreed.178 
C. The FSIA for Foreign Central Banks: Where to Start? 
The term “central bank” is neither defined in § 1603 nor 
explicitly included in the definitions of “foreign state” or 
“instrumentality.” Parties to the NML Capital decision did not 
disagree that the BCRA was an instrumentality, because the 
BCRA needed to be an instrumentality in order to decide the 
Bancec motions before the court.179 Instead, the parties argued 
  
 176 Working Group, supra note 39, at 597-98. The phrase “or instrumentality” 
would also need to be inserted after the term “a foreign state” in §§ 1604, 1605, and 
1609, to ensure that instrumentalities qualify for the general grants of immunity and 
the jurisdictional exceptions. See id. at 599, 611.  
 177 See Lee, supra note 37, at 350 n.81 (quoting the FSIA legislative history, 
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614, which states 
that entities defined as instrumentalities “could assume a variety of forms, including a 
state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a 
shipping line or airline, a steel company, [or] a central bank . . . .”).  
It is possible, but unlikely, that in a particular instance a foreign central 
bank might be deemed to be part of the foreign state itself, comparable to the 
case of a ministry of finance or treasury. In modern practice, a central bank is 
much more likely to be organized as a separate entity, at least in part 
because some degree of separation from the government is perceived as 
important to the credible conduct of monetary policy by a central bank.  
Id.  
 178 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 
187-88 (2d Cir. 2011) (arguing that foreign central banks do not need instrumentality-
like independence as described in Bancec in order to be immune from attachment).  
 179 Compare Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees EM Ltd. and NML Capital, Ltd. at 
64-65, NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 172 (No. 10-1487-cv(L)) [hereinafter Brief for EM & 
NML Capital] (inferring that the BCRA is an instrumentality under Bancec), with 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant The Republic of Argentina at 3, NML Capital, 652 F.3d 
at 172 (No. 10-1487) [hereinafter Brief for Republic of Argentina] (“BCRA is an agency 
or instrumentality of the Republic . . . .”).  
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over whether the Republic, indisputably a “foreign state,”180 
avoided its “obligations by engaging in abuses of corporate 
form”181 such that the judicial separateness of the BCRA, 
indisputably an “instrumentality,”182 should be set aside under 
Bancec. Despite the fact that the BCRA’s instrumentality 
status was not in dispute, the court distinguished “generic” 
from “special” instrumentalities: 
We hold that the plain language, history, and structure of 
§ 1611(b)(1) immunizes property of a foreign central bank or 
monetary authority held for its own account without regard to 
whether the bank or authority is independent from its parent state 
pursuant to Bancec . . . . [F]oreign central banks are not treated as 
generic “agencies and instrumentalities” of a foreign state under the 
FSIA; they are given “special protections” befitting the particular 
sovereign interest in preventing the attachment and execution of 
central bank property.183 
The court’s interpretation meant that the immunity-
from-attachment analysis for a foreign central bank was 
fundamentally different from the analysis for another 
instrumentality. The court noted that, by including 
§ 1611(b)(1), the statute treats central banks differently from 
other instrumentalities by not making the “immunity of a 
central bank’s property contingent on the independence of the 
central bank.”184  
By beginning the analysis with § 1611(b)(1) instead of a 
Bancec analysis, the court injected new force into that 
provision and effectively protected central banks’ assets from 
attachment as long as (1) the foreign central bank or parent 
government had not explicitly waived the central bank’s 
  
 180 Compare Brief for EM and NML Capital, supra note 179, at 54-55 
(inferring that the Republic is a foreign state under Bancec), with Brief for Republic of 
Argentina, supra note 179, at 29 (“BCRA is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the 
Republic . . . .”).  
 181 Brief for EM and NML Capital, supra note 179, at 54-55 (quoting De 
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 182 Compare id. at 64-65 (inferring that the BCRA is an instrumentality under 
Bancec), with Brief for Republic of Argentina, supra note 179, at 3 (“BCRA is an agency 
or instrumentality of the Republic . . . .”); see also Brief for Republic of Argentina, supra 
note 180, at 29 (“It also cannot be disputed that BCRA is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ 
of the Republic under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) . . . .”); S & S Machinery Co. v. 
Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1983) (“State-owned central banks 
indisputably are included in the [FSIA’s] definition of ‘agency or instrumentality.’” 
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 183 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 187-88 (emphasis added). 
 184 Id. at 190. 
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immunity,185 and (2) the foreign central bank “held [the assets 
in question] for its own account,”186 which the court interpreted 
to mean “traditional activities of central banks.”187 In effect, the 
court’s interpretation made §§ 1603 and 1610 much less 
relevant for foreign central bank immunity from attachment.188 
While foreign central banks continued to be instrumentalities, 
they were special because § 1611(b)(1) protected foreign central 
bank property “[n]otwithstanding the [attachment] provisions 
of section 1610.”189 The weight of this phrase is strong, 
eliminating the need to analyze the commerciality of central 
bank property, so long as such property is “held for [the foreign 
central bank’s] own account.”190 As a result, the court successfully 
crafted a fine judicial distinction between central banks and 
other instrumentalities, while accurately interpreting the FSIA’s 
plain language in the process.  
IV. STALEMATE 
For more than ten years, Argentina and its creditors 
have battled in domestic courts around the world and through 
international dispute resolution forums with no end in sight.191 
  
 185 See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (providing foreign central bank property is 
immune from attachment “unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign 
government, has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment”). 
 186 NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 195.  
 187 See id. at 191-95 (citing Patrikis, supra note 144, at 274 n.37, and 
employing Patrikis’s concept of normally understood central banking functions).  
 188 See id. at 197 (summarizing the court’s holdings without reference to 
§§ 1603 and 1610).  
 189 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
 190 Id. 
 191 $2.6 billion of judgments have been entered in both New York State and 
U.S. federal courts, and most remain unpaid. See NML Capital, 652 F.3d at 176 n.6. 
After NML Capital, the highest court in Switzerland held that Argentine funds moved 
from the FRBNY to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland 
were immune from attachment. See Argentina’s Debt Default: Gauchos and Gadflies, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 91, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
%21533453 [hereinafter Gauchos and Gadflies]. Responding to the adverse Swiss 
judgment, the vulture funds “have brought a case against Switzerland at the European 
Court of Human Rights, under Article 6 of the human-rights convention, which 
guarantees the right to a fair hearing.” Id. 
  Because Argentina has not recognized these judgments, the U.S. 
government has refused to consider a restructuring of its own credit arrangements 
with Argentina until the ICSID and U.S. court judgments are paid. See Sens. Rubio (R-
FL), Gillibrand (D-NY) and Menendez (D-NJ) Urge U.S. Treasury to Accord Equal 
Importance to Argentine Debts Owed to Paris Club Governments and Private U.S. Lenders, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sens-rubio-r-fl-
gillibrand-d-ny-and-menendez-d-nj-urge-us-treasury-to-accord-equal-importance-to-
argentine-debts-owed-to-paris-club-governments-and-private-us-lenders-136963093.html 
(“Following the Obama Administration’s announcement that it would oppose new loans 
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While the vulture funds have had modest successes in their 
attachment efforts,192 it would be a stretch to call their efforts 
successful.193 On the other side, Argentina has damaged its 
reputation as a responsible financial partner.194 Courts in the 
United States and abroad are caught in the middle of these 
disputes and often reach incongruous results, even within the 
same jurisdiction. While the Second Circuit’s NML Capital 
decision protected Argentine assets from creditors, the same 
court’s recent interpretation of pari passu clauses in Argentine 
bond documents constituted a victory for holdout creditors such 
as the vulture funds.195 Rather than clarifying the murkier 
waters of global finance, the various interpretations of the 
  
to Argentina, American Task Force Argentina (ATFA) today applauded Senators Marco 
Rubio (R-FL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) for urging the 
U.S. Treasury to formally adopt the policy of withholding approval of a Paris Club deal 
for Argentina until Argentina has satisfied all awards under bilateral investment 
treaties and outstanding U.S. court judgments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
ATFA is a creditors’ lobby devoted to pursuing “a just and fair reconciliation” of the 2001 
Argentine debt default. About Us, AM. TASK FORCE ARGENTINA, http://www.atfa.org/ 
about-us/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
 192 See Argentines Wielded Guns to Stop Moving of Ship in Ghana-Report, 
REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/argentina-
bonds-ghana-ship-idUSL1E8M97U520121109 (NML Capital, Ltd. successfully 
petitioned a Ghanaian court to allow attachment of an Argentine naval ship docked in 
Ghana in satisfaction of NML’s outstanding judgments); see also Gauchos and Gadflies, 
supra note 191 (“Some $90m was seized from the New York trustee with which shares 
of a privatised Argentine bank had been deposited. And a few million dollars were 
grabbed from a science-ministry account, used to buy telescopes, at an American 
branch of another bank. Among the assets that the holdouts have tried and so far failed 
to get are shipments of natural gas and satellites. Lawyers spent many hours arguing 
over whether the satellites, part of a multi-governmental project, should be considered 
Argentine and commercial.”). On July 6, 2011, one day after the NML Capital decision, 
the United Kingdom’s highest court held that one of the vulture funds’ U.S. judgments 
was enforceable against Argentina’s assets in the United Kingdom. See NML Capital 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, [2011] UKSC 31. “Eager to kick up as big a stink as 
possible, they have even filed a criminal money-laundering complaint against unknown 
individuals at the BIS.” Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191. Judgments against 
Argentina by American and foreign creditors have been entered through the World 
Bank’s arbitration forum, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). Id. “Some cases, such as the ICSID one, look set to rumble on for at 
least another five years.” Id.  
 193 See Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191.  
 194 Jude Webber, Fernández Wins Re-election in Argentina, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 24, 
2011, 6:42 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e26c1546-fdc5-11e0-b6d9-00144feabdc0.html 
(“Though it has restructured most of its defaulted debt, Argentina’s international 
reputation has not recovered and it may yet be blocked from returning to capital 
markets by litigious holdouts.”). 
 195 See Davidoff, supra note 152 (Elliot and Aurelius argued that “if Argentina 
paid any money on its new bonds [i.e., those issued post-restructuring] it also had to 
pay the old defaulted holders.”). In essence, the holdouts want the pari passu clauses 
“interpreted in a way that secures them a 100% payout when Argentina next services 
its restructured debt. That would jeopardise all of the restructuring done to date.” 
Gauchos and Gadflies, supra note 191.  
2013] IMMUNITY FOR RECKLESS SOVEREIGNS? 1125 
 
FSIA, and the inability to enforce those interpretations, leave 
all parties at a stalemate. Consequently, neither side has 
leverage to negotiate, proposed solutions fail, and political and 
economic realities often dwarf legal considerations.196  
A. No Incentives 
Despite the legal and financial complexities of the 
decade-long litigation, the reason why the parties have reached 
an impasse is surprisingly straightforward—a lack of pressure 
to negotiate.197 Creditors refuse to settle for less than the full 
amount due, while sovereign debtors demand settlement on their 
own terms, realizing that foreign judgments are unenforceable 
against them.198 While sovereign debt restructurings sometimes 
create incentives for creditors to work with a debtor,199 those 
incentives may be absent for lenders, such as vulture funds, 
who seek “the highest immediate return” on their investments, 
view regulation as a nuisance, and have little sympathy for 
their sophisticated, sovereign counterparties who claim that 
they cannot afford to honor their agreements.200 
However, the vulture fund strategy is not without legal 
precedent. In Elliot Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nación,201 a 
fund associated with financier Paul Singer purchased 
discounted Peruvian debt and sought to enforce the original 
agreement’s more favorable terms.202 While the district court 
denied Elliot’s request (because it found that the fund had the 
intent to sue at the time of the purchase),203 the Second Circuit 
  
 196 See Davidoff, supra note 152 (“Hernán Lorenzino, Argentina’s economy 
minister, reacted angrily to the [pari passu] decisions, saying that they were ‘a kind of 
legal colonialism . . . .’”).  
 197 See Horacio T. Liendo III, Sovereign Debt Litigation Problems in the United 
States: A Proposed Solution, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 107, 127-8 (2007).  
 198 Id. Despite the unenforceability of U.S. judgments against Argentina, 
Argentina’s default and its refusal to pay the holdout vulture fund creditors has affected its 
stock market and given the country a reputation as an untrustworthy borrower in the 
international capital markets. See Davidoff, supra note 152; Jude Webber, Argentina’s Capital 
Market Challenges, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2010, 7:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9644868-
7e28-11df-94a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Len1mgr3. 
 199 See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role 
of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1089 (2004) 
(discussing incentives to negotiation, such as desire to seek equal treatment to reduce 
cost and risk).  
 200 Id. at 1090. 
 201 194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 202 See Liendo, supra note 197, at 125 (citing Elliot Assocs. L.P. v. Banco de la 
Nación, 948 F.3d 1203, 1205-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 203 Id. 
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reversed.204 And although other creditors accepted Peru’s 
restructuring offer,205 Elliot eventually “wrung a settlement from 
Peru [in 2000] worth five times what it had paid . . . in 1996.”206 
Elliot’s court victory and successful holdout strategy 
may be the only path for holdout creditors because their other 
recourse, refusing to lend to untrustworthy borrowers, may 
“lose[] force . . . when measured against economic distress or 
outstanding political benefits” within the debtor nation.207  
Argentina’s actions in the wake of its 2001 default 
reinforce the idea that responding to an angry electorate at 
home may trump the collateral damage of diminished access to 
the international capital markets. Faced with high rates of 
unemployment and buoyed by the IMF’s self-critique of its role 
in creating the crisis,208 Argentine leaders benefited politically 
by (1) blaming the IMF for its role in the crisis,209 and (2) 
maintaining a hard line against unpopular vulture funds210 
whose ties to the United States have soured foreign relations.211 
One commentator views this hard line as an effort “to 
discourage creditors from the conduct . . . of the creditors in 
Elliot,”212—an approach that backfired during Argentina’s 
unilateral “take it or leave it” restructuring proposal in 2005,213 
which was met with lower rates of creditor acceptance than 
other restructuring countries214 and a decade of mounting U.S., 
  
 204 Id. 
 205 See id. at 125. 
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foreign, and international court judgments.215 In effect, the 
vulture funds have decided that the only way to fully vindicate 
their rights is to pursue an uncompromising global litigation 
strategy.216  
B. Inadequate Solutions 
One solution to the stalemate is an international 
bankruptcy model that has roots in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s 
Chapter 11 framework for corporate restructurings.217 On one 
level, such a framework seems necessary because no such 
international enforcement mechanism exists with the ability to 
penalize a sovereign borrower.218 One of the unique features of a 
corporate restructuring is the debtor’s ability to maintain 
control of the business and secure private funding for the 
reorganization.219 A parallel path could be created for bankrupt 
nations in which private capital markets would finance the 
sovereign restructuring, preventing the “moral hazard” that 
may occur when sovereign debtors manage their finances 
irresponsibly in reliance on an eventual IMF bailout.220 Though 
proposals for such a framework, known as the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), rely on a plan negotiated by 
a majority that would be binding on all creditors, it is likely to 
cause opposition by minority creditors such as the vulture funds. 
Responses to the current stalemate that propose the use 
of voluntary exchange offers and exit consents221 or contract-
based collective action clauses (CACs)222 are also inadequate. 
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Argentina used exchange offers and exit consents in its 2005 
and 2010 restructurings, but the vulture funds rejected any 
restructuring that offered less than the full value on the 
original terms of the bonds.223 Similar to the SDRM, CACs bind 
minority creditors to majority decisions, an approach that does 
not fit the complex reality of creditor interests in the Argentine 
restructuring, which included 152 bond issues, seven currencies, 
and the laws of eight countries.224 
C. Policy Considerations 
Aware of the inadequacy of these approaches, vulture 
funds rely on the belief that U.S. courts will vindicate their 
rights through the FSIA. However, Judge Thomas P. Griesa of 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
who presided over most of the litigation and entered several 
judgments in favor of the vulture funds, has often reminded 
plaintiffs that “they have rights but may not have remedies.”225 
His words became particularly prescient when the NML 
Capital decision gave new force to foreign central bank 
immunity from attachment,226 a position that the FRBNY and 
the U.S. government supported as amici curiae.227 In light of the 
bipartisan political support for refusing to loan money to 
Argentina until it pays its U.S. court judgments,228 the amicus 
briefs on Argentina’s behalf seem contradictory. While the 
power of the creditors’ lobby in Washington may explain recent 
political support,229 an even more commanding influence drives 
in favor of protecting Argentine assets in the United States—
namely, the goal of maintaining international funds in the 
United States.230 When foreign funds at the FRBNY are placed 
at risk of attachment, uncertainty causes foreign officials to 
withdraw funds, potentially having “an unsettling effect on 
foreign exchange markets . . . [,] international monetary 
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stability,” and “the U.S. balance of payments.”231 As assets leave 
the United States for safer jurisdictions, such as Switzerland’s 
attachment-proof Bank of International Settlements,232 the 
flight may begin to affect the value and preeminence of the 
dollar. Although the Second Circuit based its statutory 
interpretation of foreign central bank immunity from 
attachment on the “plain language” of the FSIA,233 these 
enormous political and economic factors can be powerful 
drivers behind courts’ reasoning.  
CONCLUSION 
Foreign central banks present challenging issues for 
purposes of sovereign immunity. As a banking entity, the 
central bank is commercial by nature—a fact that Congress 
accounted for when it drafted the special foreign central bank 
provisions of § 1611(b)(1).234 Unless there has been an explicit 
waiver of a foreign central bank’s immunity, courts should 
follow the NML Capital precedent and grant broad immunity 
to the assets of foreign central banks in the United States. In 
the unlikely event that Congress moves immediately to amend 
the statute, there are strong legal, political, and economic 
arguments for interpreting § 1611(b)(1) as a bulwark against 
the attachment of foreign central bank assets in the United 
States. As disgruntled creditors begin to realize that the 
United States has strong incentives to protect foreign central 
bank assets and foreign nations start to understand the severe 
impact of default on their reputation as credible borrowers, 
each party should develop renewed incentives to negotiate 
disputes and continue participation in international capital 
markets. Until then, the blame game will continue.  
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